Universal Proceduralism by Janger, Edward J.
Brooklyn Journal of International Law
Volume 32
Issue 3
SYMPOSIUM: Bankruptcy in the Global Village:
The Second Decade
Article 5
2007
Universal Proceduralism
Edward J. Janger
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Edward J. Janger, Universal Proceduralism, 32 Brook. J. Int'l L. (2007).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol32/iss3/5
UNIVERSAL PROCEDURALISM 
Edward J. Janger* 
ight years ago, I published an Article entitled Predicting When the 
Uniform Law Process Will Fail: Article 9, Capture, and the Race 
to the Bottom.1 The Article focused on the effects of capture and jurisdic-
tional competition on the uniform law drafting process in the United 
States. I concluded that the desire for uniform and universal adoption of 
their work product would force uniform law drafters to anticipate (and 
acquiesce to) the possibility that state legislatures might be captured by 
affected interest groups or engage in a race to the bottom.2 Accordingly, 
I argued that the uniform lawmaking process should: (1) limit its aspira-
tion to seeking procedural and transactional efficiencies; (2) promote 
legislation based only on broad-based consensus; and (3) shy away from 
legal questions with important distributional consequences.3 These are, 
of course, broad prescriptions, and the devil is in the details. Neverthe-
less, subsequent events appear to have borne out my predictions about 
the limits of domestic harmonization efforts.4 
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 1. Edward J. Janger, Predicting When the Uniform Law Process Will Fail: Article 9, 
Capture, and the Race to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 569 (1998) [hereinafter Janger, 
Uniform Law Process]; see also Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Econ-
omy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1995); Robert E. Scott, The Politics 
of Article 9, 80 VA. L. REV. 1783 (1994); Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Fed-
eralism and the Uniform Laws Process: Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83 (1993); Edward L. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, Acting 
Like a Lobbyist: Some Notes on the Process of Revising UCC Articles 3 and 4, 26 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 743 (1993). 
 2. Janger, Uniform Law Process, supra note 1, at 630–31. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See, e.g., Robert K. Rasmussen, The Uneasy Case Against the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 62 LA. L. REV. 1097, 1100-01 (2002) (reviewing the most recent efforts to 
revise U.C.C. Articles 2, 3, 4 and 9); Richard E. Speidel, Revising UCC Article 2: A View 
from the Trenches, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 607, 608 (2001) (describing the Article 2 revision 
process); see also Neil B. Cohen, Taking Democracy Seriously, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 667, 
670 (2001) (describing interest group participation in the Article 2 revision process); 
Linda J. Rusch, A History and Perspective of Revised Article 2: The Never Ending Saga 
of a Search for Balance, 52 S.M.U. L. REV. 1683, 1689 (1999) (stating that “interest 
groups have been very active in the Article 2 revision process”). 
E 
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As soon as I finished the Article, I started thinking about its implica-
tions for efforts to harmonize international law. It seemed to me that 
there was a useful insight there somewhere. I held back, however, out of 
lack of knowledge and a sense that the efficiencies to be obtained from 
international harmonization might be greater than the comparatively 
marginal benefits associated with revising the Uniform Commercial 
Code. A few years ago, Jay Westbrook tried to nudge me into writing on 
the subject of transnational insolvency by inviting me to a conference at 
the University of Texas. Much to his chagrin, I chose to present, instead, 
on the subject of data privacy in bankruptcy.5 Even then, however, a dif-
ferent type of reticence was causing me to hold back. By this time, the 
poles of the transnational insolvency debate had been defined: Universal-
ism on one side and Territorialism on the other.6 With Jay manning one 
battlement and Lynn LoPucki the other—two scholars I consider friends 
and, on many things, intellectual fellow travelers—it was like watching 
one’s parents fight. Choosing sides in such situations is frightening, seek-
ing to mediate, dangerous. Better to wait; better to make sure that I knew 
where I stood. I’m still not 100% sure where I stand, but I am ready to 
break my silence. 
My goal in this Article is to shift the terms of the debate somewhat by 
using the tools I identified almost a decade ago to ask a more nuanced 
pair of architectural questions: “When are universalism and harmoniza-
                                                                                                             
 5. See Edward J. Janger, Muddy Property: Generating and Protecting Information 
Privacy Norms in Bankruptcy, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1801 (2003). 
 6. Compare Jay L. Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 
MICH. L. REV. 2276, 2299 (2000) [hereinafter Westbrook, Global Solution] (“[T]he 
proper long-term, theoretical solution to the problem of multinational insolvency is uni-
versalism, whether or not such a solution is achievable in the foreseeable future.”), Jay L. 
Westbrook & Jacob S. Ziegel, The American Law Institute NAFTA Insolvency Project, 23 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 7, 24 (1997) (“[R]egional agreements may be the best first step in 
solving many of the problems of legal harmonization and cooperation coincident to the 
globalization of trade and investment.”), and Jay L. Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance 
Law in Global Insolvencies, 17 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 499, 503 (1991) (“I believe that tradi-
tional approaches are simply unsuited to current realities. The formal manipulation of 
rules that purport to make “territorial” distinctions in multi-territorial transactions offers 
scant help in analyzing conflicts questions arising from modern multinational enter-
prise.”), with Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-
Universalist Approach, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 696, 750 (1999) [hereinafter LoPucki, Co-
operation] (“Cooperative territoriality . . . eliminates the tension between countries by 
vesting each with bankruptcy power congruent with its sovereignty. No nation need rec-
ognize foreign authority over domestic assets or sacrifice the interests of local debtors or 
creditors in particular cases. The elimination of that universalist tension provides the 
foundation for cooperation among courts and representatives that will be mutually bene-
ficial in each case.”). 
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tion desirable, and when should territorialism and non-uniformity gov-
ern?” Neither Jay nor Lynn take pure positions in favor of universalism 
or territoriality. Jay now advocates a position of modified universalism,7 
and Lynn has always advocated cooperative rather than pure territorial-
ism.8 Both, however, view their moderation as a concession. Jay hopes 
the world will eventually be ready for true universalism, and views 
“modified universalism” as a camel’s nose under the tent.9 Lynn wishes 
to head off jurisdictional competition and forum shopping, and views 
cooperative territoriality as a concession to globalization. Jay seeks one 
case under one law.10 Lynn prefers many cases under many laws.11 I start 
from a more neutral perspective and conclude pragmatically that the 
most we should hope for is one case under many laws. I advocate a re-
gime that I call “universal proceduralism.”12 Such a regime would con-
sist of “universal” but minimally harmonized rules of transnational bank-
ruptcy procedure, harmonized choice of law, and non-uniform substan-
                                                                                                             
 7. Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 6, at 2277 (“Modified universalism . . . is 
the best answer because its pragmatic flexibility provides the best fit with the problem 
presented by the current patchwork of laws in the global market, and because it will fos-
ter the smoothest and fastest transition to true universalism.”). 
 8. LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 6, at 696 (“A system of cooperative territorial-
ity is optimal even though it potentially requires multiple filing and prosecution of 
claims, cooperation among courts and administrators with respect to particular reorgani-
zations and liquidations, and international agreements to control fleeing assets.”). 
 9. See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 6, at 2299 (“Although I am more 
optimistic than others, universalism may not be obtainable in the foreseeable future.”); 
see also John A. E. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism: A Model for International Bank-
ruptcy, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 935, 992 (2005) (The Model Law’s “gentle incrementalism 
regarding indirect, non-core areas of the law likely assuaged some hesitant, territorialism-
inclined states skeptical about universalism’s benefits, and perhaps even tricked (to their 
paternalistic betterment) some troglodyte states prejudiced against universalism alto-
gether.”). 
 10. See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 6, at 2292 (“There are two elements 
necessary to a universalist convention for international bankruptcy: a single law and a 
single forum to govern each multinational case. These two elements are distinct and need 
not necessarily be conjoined in an international bankruptcy system, although ideally they 
would be.”). 
 11. LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 6, at 742 (“[T]he system I propose . . . is a 
system in which each country would administer the assets located within its own bor-
ders.”). 
 12. As I will discuss later, I think that the UNCITRAL Model Law is an excellent 
first step toward such a regime. See UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insol-
vency, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., 72d plen. mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. A/52/PV.72 (Dec. 15, 
1997) [hereinafter Model Law]. The UNCITRAL Model Law has been enacted by the 
United States, and Chapter 15 incorporates the Model Law into the Bankruptcy Code 
with relatively few modifications. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1532 (2006). 
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tive law.13 Moreover, I propose this not as a palliative, but as a norma-
tively preferred regime. 
The analysis is divided into four parts. In the first part, I will briefly 
review the state of the debate between Jay and Lynn, and stake out my 
reservations about both approaches—the risks associated with Jay’s aspi-
ration to universality and harmonization of bankruptcy law, and the over-
emphasis by Lynn on the problem of pernicious forum shopping. In the 
second part, I will develop my model for minimal transparent harmoniza-
tion, a model that seeks to head off pernicious forum shopping while har-
nessing the benefits of jurisdictional competition where they exist. I will 
seek to articulate a minimal set of universal rules for bankruptcy cases 
that will, to the extent possible: (1) harmonize the few sets of procedures 
that are necessary to facilitate international bankruptcy cases (and no 
more); (2) allow jurisdictional competition as to efficient procedures; (3) 
render the choice of forum irrelevant/transparent as to the substantive 
law governing the entitlements of parties; and (4) limit the extent to 
which global economic integration will interfere with local choices about 
how to structure and govern business affairs. In the third part, I will ar-
gue for the normative preferability of my model to either of the “polar” 
approaches, and explain why I hold an entirely different view with regard 
to domestic insolvency law. Finally, in the fourth part, I will conclude 
with an evaluation of Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and the 
E.U. Insolvency Regulation in light of my approach. 
I. COMPETING VISIONS OF CROSS-BORDER BANKRUPTCY LAW 
When insolvency law was simply a local law for winding up a failed 
business and distributing its assets, local procedures for liquidation were 
sufficient, and local law governed.14 Insolvency law had little to offer, 
and the law was, for all relevant purposes, harmonized. “Grab-law” pre-
vailed.15 Starting in the nineteenth century with railroad receiverships,16 
                                                                                                             
 13. I do not oppose convergence or standardization of substantive bankruptcy law per 
se, though I do have reservations with regard to the proper scope of harmonization. These 
comments are not meant to indict or criticize the efforts under way at UNCITRAL and 
the World Bank to promulgate legislative guides for insolvency law. See, e.g., U.N. 
COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON SECURED TRANS-
ACTIONS, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.VI/WP.31/Add.1 (2007). 
 14. Indeed, this is still the default. See, e.g., Jennifer Greene, Note, Bankruptcy Be-
yond Borders: Recognizing Foreign Proceedings in Cross-Border Insolvencies, 30 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 685, 704–05 (2005); Sara Isham, Note, UNCITRAL’s Model Law on 
Cross-Border Insolvency: A Workable Protection for Transnational Investment at Last, 
26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1177, 1180–81 (2001).  
 15. Bruce Mann describes the early U.S. debt collection process as follows: 
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and maturing in the last quarter of the twentieth century with the adop-
tion of Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, a legal architecture de-
veloped, premised on two ideas: (1) the value of an insolvent enterprise 
might be maximized for the benefit of its creditors by continuing to oper-
ate the business as a going concern rather than selling it off piecemeal; 
and (2) the market might need a little bit of help in arranging such “effi-
cient” reorganizations.17 Going concern reorganizations are difficult 
enough to achieve where a business operates in one place, with one es-
tablishment and one corporate governance structure. The procedures 
used for accomplishing such reorganizations are highly contested.18 The 
complexities and controversies multiply when a corporate group is in-
volved, and multiply exponentially when the enterprise crosses jurisdic-
tional boundaries. The challenge for the practitioners of transnational 
                                                                                                             
Since priority among unsecured creditors was determined by the order in which 
they served process on the debtor, and among secured creditors by the order in 
which they took security in the same property, time was, indeed, money. Credi-
tors who acted earlier took precedence over creditors who acted later. Once one 
creditor sued, all creditors had to sue to claim a place in line. 
BRUCE MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF AMERICAN 
INDEPENDENCE 48 (2002). 
 16. See DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN 
AMERICA 48–70 (2001) (also discussing railroad receverships); Douglas G. Baird & 
Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Property Rights, and the Conceptual Foundations 
of Corporate Reorganizations, 87 VA. L. REV. 921, 925–31 (2001) (discussing railroad 
receiverships).  
 17. See Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
173, 181–86 (1987). 
 18. Compare Ted Janger, Crystals and Mud In Bankruptcy Law: Judicial Competence 
and Statutory Design, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 559 (2001), and Elizabeth Warren & Jay Law-
rence Westbrook, Contracting Out of Bankruptcy: An Empirical Intervention, 118 HARV. 
L. REV. 1197 (2005), with Barry E. Adler, A World Without Debt, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 811 
(1994), Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 751 (2002), Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 
573 (1998), Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 
11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1078–79 (1992) (“Chapter 11 should be repealed, abolishing 
court-supervised corporate reorganizations and, in effect, precluding residual claimants 
from participating in any reorganization of the firm.”), Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor’s 
Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV. 51, 53–54 (1992), 
and Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 
1807, 1821–22 (1998). For a response to Schwartz, see Lynn M. LoPucki, Contract 
Bankruptcy: A Reply to Alan Schwartz, 109 YALE L.J. 317 (1999), and for a surreply, see 
Alan Schwartz, Bankruptcy Contracting Reviewed, 109 YALE L.J. 343 (1999).  
 
 
824 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 32:3 
insolvency law is to figure out how to achieve the benefits of reorganiza-
tion across national boundaries.19  
A. Universalism (Jay) Versus Territorialism (Lynn) 
For Jay, the answer lies in a bankruptcy regime that is symmetric with 
the market it governs.20 Under such a regime, one case, and one bank-
ruptcy regime would govern the insolvency of a transnational entity.21 As 
a pragmatic transitional approach, he advocates what he calls “modified 
universalism.” Under a modified universalist regime, the insolvency case 
is governed from the debtor’s center of main interest (COMI). Assets in 
multiple jurisdictions are administered (at least in the first instance) by 
the local courts, but those courts defer to the main proceeding for ad-
ministration of the case.22 This is the approach embodied in the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (the “Model 
Law”)23 enacted as Chapter 15 of the United States Bankruptcy Code 
(“Chapter 15”) and also by the E.U. Regulation on Cross-Border Insol-
vencies (the “E.U. Reg.”). 24 
For Lynn, universalism is a quixotic dream and modified universalism 
a dangerous Trojan horse, likely to do more harm than good. His princi-
pal concern is forum shopping.25 Lynn has done path-breaking research 
on the effect of jurisdictional competition and forum shopping in the 
United States, and concludes that, on balance, cases that are forum 
shopped to Delaware or New York do worse for their stakeholders than 
cases that are handled in other courts.26 The reason for these poor results 
                                                                                                             
 19. It is important, as a preliminary matter, to distinguish the goal of allowing effi-
cient transnational reorganizations from the goal of “exporting” a U.S. model for Chapter 
11. While the U.S. model is perhaps the most advanced, it is no longer unique, and it is 
far from perfect. The question we all pose is whether an international effort to harmonize 
insolvency law can facilitate efficient reorganizations, and, if they can, are related costs 
excessive. I propose to remain agnostic (at least for the purposes of this piece) on the 
“best” way to run a reorganization. 
 20. Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 6, at 2283 (“The central theoretical point 
is ‘market symmetry’: the requirement that some systems in a legal regime must be sym-
metrical with the market, covering all or nearly all transactions and stakeholders in that 
market with respect to the legal rights and duties embraced by those systems.”). 
 21. Id. at 2292. 
 22. Id. at 2300. 
 23. See Model Law, supra note 12, arts. 15–24. 
 24. See Council Regulation 1346/2000, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 1 (EC). 
 25. LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE 30 (2005). 
 26. Id. at 137–81 (finding that bankruptcy cases handled by Delaware and New York 
courts were prone to several abuses, including exaggerated professional fees, rubber-
stamping of prepackaged plans, and retention of failed and corrupt managers).  
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turns, in his view, on an agency problem coupled with a race to the bot-
tom.  
The dynamic works this way. Under U.S. bankruptcy law, incumbent 
management chooses the bankruptcy attorneys and continues to operate 
the debtor in bankruptcy. They therefore have control over venue choice. 
Accordingly, the venue chosen is likely to be the one most favorable to 
incumbent management and/or its attorneys.27 Bankruptcy judges, ac-
cording to Lynn, enjoy handling large, high-profile cases more than a 
steady diet of consumers and failed real estate partnerships.28 These 
courts therefore compete for large cases by offering the best package to 
the “case placers”—incumbent management and their attorneys.29 
Under Lynn’s view, this competition among courts in the United States 
has had a pernicious effect on bankruptcy law and upon the results in 
actual cases. His concern is that universalism in international bankruptcy 
will simply take judicial competition global and replicate the poor results 
of Delaware in the 1990s internationally.30 For this reason he opposed 
the adoption of Chapter 15, and opposes further enactment of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law.31 
I have concerns about both Jay’s and Lynn’s approaches to transna-
tional insolvency law—about modified universalism and cooperative 
territorialism. On the one hand, my articulated concerns about uniform 
lawmaking are applicable to international harmonization efforts and 
make me worry about the universalist approach. On the other hand, I 
think that Lynn’s concerns are overdrawn, and that the benefits of effi-
cient reorganization of corporate groups across jurisdictional lines are 
considerable. Because Lynn and I are both motivated by concerns about 
jurisdictional competition, I will first lay out the differences between my 
views and his. 
B. LoPucki and the Oversimplification of Jurisdictional Competition 
Lynn has a point. The possibility of jurisdictional competition is an 
important dynamic that must be considered when seeking to harmonize 
any area of law. However, it is not enough to say, “Jurisdictions will 
compete, therefore we must not create a regime that will facilitate forum 
shopping.” There are two intuitive problems with this assertion. First, 
                                                                                                             
 27. Id. at 138. 
 28. See id. at 248–49. 
 29. Id. at 249–51. 
 30. Id. at 183–205. 
 31. See id. at 207–232 (arguing that forum shopping and its failures will flourish un-
der the UNCITRAL Model Law). 
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competition is not always bad.32 Second, harmonization generally re-
duces rather than increases the stakes of forum shopping.33 
The common wisdom views competition among market participants as 
a good thing. Markets are not perfect, but when they work, they reward 
efficiencies and punish inefficiency.34 Competition among jurisdictions 
can fit this model. LoPucki, however, analogizes jurisdictional competi-
tion in the bankruptcy context to the competition for corporate charters 
by Delaware, and labels it a “race to the bottom.”35 He does this by ad-
ministering a powerful one-two punch to the usual assumptions about 
competition. First, he introduces an agency problem: incumbent man-
agement will choose the jurisdiction that will most willingly allow them 
to loot the company.36 Second, he strips away the principal institution 
situated to prevent such looting—judges applying the law.37 Lynn ab-
stracts the judges away by branding the Delaware and New York judges 
as corrupt and antinomian competitors for big case business. 
                                                                                                             
 32. See Ralph K. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the 
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 256 (1977) (arguing that competition among states to 
attract corporations results in a “race to the top” which actually benefits shareholders); 
see also Roberta Romano, The Need For Competition In International Securities Regula-
tion, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 387, 392–93 (2001).  
Regulatory competition subjects government agencies to fluctuating inflows 
and outflows of regulated entities as firms transfer their activities to come un-
der the jurisdiction of the regulator whose regime they prefer. Such competition 
is desirable because it reduces the possibility that a regulator will be able to 
transfer wealth across different regulated entities or redistribute wealth from the 
regulated sector to preferred individuals or organizations. 
Id. 
 33. See Gregor C. Heinrich, Funds, Transfers, Payments, and Payments Systems—
International Initiatives Towards Legal Harmonization, 28 INT’L LAW. 787, 788 
(“[H]armonization of rules reduces the risk that a problem will be treated and solved 
differently in other countries, thus curtailing a tendency towards ‘forum shopping.’”)  
 34. See, e.g., Arthur R. Pinto, The Internationalization of the Hostile Takeover Mar-
ket: Its Implications for Choice of Law in Corporate and Securities Law, 16 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 55, 63 (1990) (stating that “increased competition within and between [securi-
ties] markets provides benefits, such as lower costs of capital for firms, and allows inves-
tors to further diversify their investments”).  
 35. See LOPUCKI, supra note 25, at 243 (“[T]here was no longer any reason to believe 
that the courts were engaged in a race to the top. . . . The bankruptcy court competition is 
not a market but a market failure.”). 
 36. Id. at 241–42 (“Most managers facing bankruptcy . . . seek a court that will not 
investigate them too carefully, will pay them bonuses, and will allow them to negotiate a 
graceful exit.”). 
 37. Id. at 247–49. 
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Lynn extends both concerns to the international context by analogy, 
and tars universalist harmonization efforts with the “Delaware” brush. 
He assumes that jurisdictional and judicial competition in the interna-
tional context will be uniformly pernicious, and he fears that adoption of 
the Model Law will facilitate this competition by centralizing the control 
of a case in one court. The same centralizing force that creates the ability 
to reorganize an international entity may increase the harm that a judge 
can do if he or she answers to the interests of incumbent management 
rather than the best interests of the estate.38 Whether or not Lynn’s de-
scriptions of U.S. law and, in particular, U.S. judges are correct, I leave 
to another day.39 Still, one certainly cannot assume their accuracy in the 
international context. In my view, both Lynn’s economic and his institu-
tional critiques of the Model Law are important but overstated. While he 
may be right about the results of forum shopping in Delaware in the 
1990s, Lynn’s proclamation that forum shopping leads inevitably to a 
“race to the bottom” is debatable; he fails to distinguish good competi-
tion from bad, and he ignores the existence of competing institutions in 
the international context that might operate as brakes on the pernicious 
competition that he fears. 
My initial focus will be on Lynn’s economic account of jurisdictional 
competition. I will offer a more nuanced account of the effects of juris-
dictional competition on legal harmonization efforts, and will seek to 
show that Lynn is drawing too many conclusions about the Model Law 
from the Delaware example. 
C. The Model  
Where efforts to harmonize international law are involved, jurisdic-
tional competition does not operate overtly. It enters by the back door—
through concerns about enactability. When international organizations 
such as UNCITRAL or UNIDROIT promulgate model laws, their en-
actments are not self executing. Therefore, the drafters must consider the 
                                                                                                             
 38. See id. at 231. 
 39. I am considerably more sanguine about the ethics and abilities of U.S. bankruptcy 
judges than Lynn, who describes the judicial appointment process as follows: 
When a bankruptcy judgeship becomes available, the community seeks to in-
stall one of its own. More often than not, the effort succeeds. As with any posi-
tion of leadership, the one chosen incurs a debt to his or her supporters. Those 
supporters expect a certain amount of loyalty. If a judge forgets how he or she 
got the job, the judge will be reminded if and when the judge seeks a second 
term. 
Id. at 20. 
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possible effects of jurisdictional competition and interest group capture 
on national legislatures. It is by now, therefore, axiomatic that model or 
uniform laws only achieve wide adoption in two circumstances: (1) 
where they provide considerable benefits over the status quo40; and (2) 
where there is a consensus about what the right rule is.41 In my earlier 
                                                                                                             
 40. See James J. White, Ex Proprio Vigore, MICH. L. REV. 2096, 2096 (1991). 
The National Conference of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
(NCCUSL) is a legislature in every way but one. It drafts uniform acts, debates 
them, passes them, and promulgates them, but that passage and promulgation 
do not make these uniform acts law over any citizen of any state. These acts 
become the law of the various states only ex proprio vigore—only if their own 
vitality influences the legislatures of the various states to pass them. 
Id. 
 41. See Homer Kripke, The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, U. ILL. L. F. 321, 327 (1962) (“Difficult legislation like this without a 
popular appeal can seldom be passed without a broad consensus of agreement of inter-
ested parties.”). However, the consensus may be the product of a strong interest group 
with disorganized opposition. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Econ-
omy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 638–43 (1995) (discussing the influ-
ence that banks had o nthe creation and revisions of Articles 3 and 4); Robert E. Scott, 
The Politics of Article 9, 80 VA. L. REV. 1783, 1822–47 (1994) (examining the influence 
of interest groups on the Article 9 revision process); see also Edward Janger, Predicting 
When the Uniform Law Process Will Fail: Article 9, Capture, and the Race to the Bot-
tom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 569, 584–88 (1998) (discussing the impact of capture by interest 
groups upon the ALI and NCCUSL uniform law drafting process). In a previous Article, I 
made this point in the following manner: 
[Uniform law drafters must] draft a statute where state competition will not in-
duce states to enact nonuniform versions of the code. On the one hand, this 
competition will encourage drafters to produce a good product—a statute that is 
well drafted and substantively superior to competing nonuniform laws regulat-
ing the same subject matter. However, they must also anticipate the likely re-
sults of interstate competition and neutralize it. In the uniform law drafting 
process, the desire for universal and uniform adoption drives the drafters to 
predict and follow the direction that state competition will lead. If state compe-
tition will encourage a race to the top, the drafters will be driven to create an ef-
ficient rule. But if competition will yield a race to the bottom, the drafters, if 
they are to preserve uniformity, must scrape the bottom as well. 
Janger, Uniform Law Process, supra note 1, at 591. This idea has been similarly sec-
onded by Robert Rasmussen: 
[T]he U.C.C. competes not against academic visions of optimal regulation but 
against products of other flawed institutional processes. Bringing interest group 
analysis to the private legislature has not removed interest groups from public 
legislatures. With our new understanding of the drafting process of the U.C.C., 
the question becomes one of comparative political economy—which of the 
many imperfect institutions should have the primary authority for crafting 
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Article, I borrowed from Lucian Bebchuk’s 1992 Article on jurisdic-
tional competition for corporate charters to discuss how the desire for 
uniform enactment can interact with the dynamics of jurisdictional com-
petition for both good and ill.42 Bebchuk argues that competition is gen-
erally a good thing, but that it goes awry in the face of “interjurisdic-
tional” externality and intra-firm agency problems.43 Where a small state 
can attract firms through legal rules that harm people in other states, or 
where one corporate constituency (managers, shareholders, or secured 
creditors) can advantage themselves at the expense of a disenfranchised 
constituency within a firm, competition will be pernicious. 
Where the effects of competition are likely to be pernicious, the desire 
of harmonizers for uniform enactment compounds the mischief. First, if 
the “benefits” of a proposed law are narrowly concentrated on a particu-
lar interest group and the costs are widely disbursed, the perceived con-
sensus behind a proposed uniform or model law may actually reflect rent 
                                                                                                             
commercial law. Here, the U.C.C. does have advantages over public legisla-
tures that have been under appreciated in the recent debate. Primarily, the struc-
ture of the U.C.C. drafting and revision process suggests that it will produce a 
more technically competent set of laws than would a public legislature. Much 
legislation produced by public legislatures is a slapdash affair. On average, it is 
going to have more gaps and internal inconsistencies than legislation produced 
via the U.C.C. process. In addition, the U.C.C. may reduce rent extraction by 
public legislatures. The need to adhere to the U.C.C. constrains the ability of 
legislators to offer favors to interest groups. Finally, even in areas where inter-
est group dynamics suggest that there will be predictable flaws in the rules gen-
erated by the U.C.C. drafting process, the current situation which allows selec-
tive intervention by the federal government may be preferable to one that 
lodged initial lawmaking responsibility either in the state legislatures or the 
federal government. 
Rasmussen, supra note 4, at 1104. 
 42. Janger, Uniform Law Process, supra note 1, at 589–90 (citing Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in 
Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992) for the proposition that competition in 
state rule-making can lead to either a race to the top or a race to the bottom). 
 43. Bebchuk, supra note 42, at 1484; see also Edward J. Janger, The Death of Se-
cured Lending, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1759, 1779–80 (2004).  
[I]t is possible to predict whether state competition will be efficient or ineffi-
cient by asking two questions about the statute. First, does it give rise to the 
possibility of intra-firm externality by allowing one corporate constituency 
(such as shareholders or mangers) to impose costs on another (such as creditors 
or rank and file employees)? Second, does the statute give rise to the possibility 
of interstate externality, by allowing one state to impose costs on the citizens of 
another state? 
Id. 
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seeking by a particular group, rather than a universally recognized social 
benefit. Enactment of a proposed uniform law under these circumstances 
benefits the interested group virally, at the expense of the general public. 
Second, problems can arise where a small state can impose costs on the 
rest of the world. Where one jurisdiction can benefit itself at the expense 
of others, the harmonizers must anticipate the effect of captured legisla-
tures and jurisdictional competition in order to obtain or preserve univer-
sal adoption. Uniform laws are helpless in the face of, and may even fur-
ther, these effects.44 
By contrast, in the absence of these perverse dynamics, competition is 
a good thing. States may seek to compete based on various criteria: pro-
cedural innovations, well-run courts, economic infrastructure, well-
trained work force, legal predictability, or legal creativity.45 These types 
of competition should be encouraged, even though they may pose prob-
lems for harmonization. Uniformity should not, where possible, stand in 
the way of innovation or experimentation. 
Harmonizers must therefore anticipate these dual dynamics when con-
structing a law for which they seek uniform adoption. They must beware 
of pernicious competition and avoid facilitating it, while either anticipat-
ing beneficial competition or, better yet, permitting it to flourish. This is 
not an inevitable indictment of harmonization efforts. Instead, it raises 
questions. First, can the scope and content of a harmonization effort be 
designed to foster beneficial competition and head off pernicious compe-
tition? Second, is the pernicious competition a permanent or transitory 
problem that will ultimately be forestalled or corrected by other institu-
tions? Even ‘pernicious’ jurisdictional competition is not likely to suc-
ceed in the long run unless it is linked to a permanent (or at least persis-
tent) agency problem.46 Where a jurisdiction is adopting an inefficient 
rule in order to compete for some form of business, market discipline 
should correct the problem over time. Only where there is an interested 
                                                                                                             
 44. See Janger, Uniform Law Process, supra note 1, at 578 (noting that competition 
exists among states to enact uniform laws that will enhance a state’s attractiveness to 
business). 
 45. See generally Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorpora-
tion Puzzle, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985).  
 46. Since in the corporate context the corrective to the race to the bottom is the mar-
ket for corporate control, Bebchuk is particularly skeptical about Delaware laws that 
undercut transparency or discourage takeovers. Bebchuk, supra note 42, at 1462–63. In 
the Article 9 context, I argued that a race to the bottom may be created by the disenfran-
chisement of certain non-consensual and non-adjusting creditors. Janger, Uniform Law 
Process, supra note 1, at 592 (“The problem of intrafirm externality exists whenever 
there is a conflict of interest between corporate managers and one corporate constituency 
that cannot make its voice heard.”). 
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group that is consistently on the receiving end of an externality (because 
it lacks a voice in the choice of forum) will forum shopping lead to the 
permanent adoption of an inefficient rule.47 
D. Applying the Model—Territoriality, Constrained Venue Choice, 
Choice of Law, and the Benefits of Competition 
With these principles in mind, I argued that domestically, in the con-
text of commercial law, the uniform law process ought to focus on pro-
cedural efficiencies and avoid distributive choices.48 Distributive ques-
tions should be addressed at the local (non-uniform) level to allow for 
competition and diversity of approach, or, where uniformity is necessary 
or pernicious competition inevitable, at the federal level.49 
When evaluating an international harmonization effort in this light, it is 
crucial to identify the key attributes of the legal scheme and to allocate 
them to the appropriate lawmaking level—local or harmonized. Unlike 
lawmaking in the United States and European Union, there is no “fed-
eral” or supranational authority that can command uniformity.50 My con-
cerns about both Lynn and Jay’s positions turn on the failure to distin-
guish among: (1) rules for choice of forum (which carries with it choice 
of procedure); (2) rules for choice of law; and (3) rules creating substan-
                                                                                                             
 47. Of course, the short-run/long-run argument does nothing in the abstract. If short 
run costs can be prevented through regulation (without adverse consequences), so much 
the better. 
 48. My argument went as follows: 
Because the uniform law process appears to have both relative advantages and 
disadvantages over the federal and nonuniform law drafting processes, it might 
seem wise to self-consciously adopt an approach of selective abstention. When 
there is no reason to expect the uniform law process to fail, it should be allowed 
to function and do what it does well. However, when capture, anticipated cap-
ture, or an anticipated race to the bottom are likely to drive the uniform law 
process, the ALI/NCCUSL should decline to regulate the area and leave the 
question to federal law or nonuniform state law. 
Janger, Uniform Law Process, supra note 1, at 593. 
 49. Id.  
 50. Where transnational insolvency is concerned, a crucial element of the calculus is 
that there is no federal government that can compel the compliance of all participants 
across jurisdictions. On the other hand, a second institution is present in the international 
context, which is missing in the United States—strong states (not subject to the suprem-
acy clause or commerce clause) willing to defend their sovereignty. 
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tive entitlements.51 Jay and Lynn both collapse these three types together, 
and therefore draw their prescriptions too broadly.  
The UNCITRAL Model Law focuses on the first question and does not 
speak to the last two.52 As John Pottow has pointed out, this narrow pro-
cedural focus is politically expedient.53 For Jay, it is only a first step in a 
larger program to harmonize both procedure and substance.54 For Lynn, 
it is already a step too far.55 For me, it is also a first step on the way to an 
even more important second step, harmonizing choice of law principles, 
but I would, for the most part, stop there.56 
It is here that I think Lynn’s critique takes a wrong turn. Lynn sees the 
Model Law as enhancing the power of the debtor’s chosen forum, and 
hence increasing the stakes of jurisdictional competition.57 He is right 
that the universalist aspects of the Model Law increase the importance of 
the “main” forum, but Lynn ignores the fact that the Model Law simulta-
neously constrains forum choice. Lynn’s mistake here is to ignore (or at 
                                                                                                             
 51. For our purposes, while choice of forum, rules for choice of procedure, and rules 
of procedure can be conceptually distinguished, jurisdictions always apply their own 
procedures. Choice of forum, therefore, carries with it choice of procedure. 
 52. See Pottow, supra note 9, at 995 (“[T]he Model Law sought to focus on matters of 
procedure and thereby . . . minimized the likelihood it would be perceived as a substantial 
threat to sovereignty.”). 
 53. Id.  
 54. See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 6, at 2279 (“While the current re-
forms are only first steps, they go well beyond what most observers would have predicted 
just five years ago.”). 
 55. See LOPUCKI, supra note 25, at 222 (“The problem [of jurisdiction in multina-
tional bankruptcies] cannot be solved merely by providing that all members of the group 
should file in the home country of the group.”). For LoPucki, harmonization (even proce-
dural harmonization) is likely to have undesirable substantive consequences: 
Harmonization is a euphemism for forcing commercially less important coun-
tries to adopt the remedies and priorities of the commercially more important 
countries. (Some Machiavellians may have endorsed universalism in the first 
place hoping it would lead to this forced harmonization.) That harmonization 
would be painful for people in countries that would be forced to change the ba-
sic rules of their economic cultures—for example, elevating secured banks to 
priority over employees. Such harmonization would greatly reduce the incen-
tives for forum shopping. But it would hardly eliminate the international com-
petition for cases. 
Id. at 231–32. 
 56. With regard to efforts to achieve international convergence in bankruptcy law 
currently under way at UNCITRAL and the World Bank, I have reservations. However, 
both projects appear to be moving forward with a healthy recognition of the risks I articu-
late here. I hope to discuss them in a later article. 
 57. LOPUCKI, supra note 25, at 231. 
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least minimize) the limit imposed by the requirement that the main case 
be located at the debtor’s center of main interest. He therefore overstates 
the change worked by the Model Law. Lynn also underestimates the in-
dependent importance of choice of law in the forum shopping equation. 
Just because a single court administers a case does not necessarily mean 
that the court will apply its own law of substantive entitlements. First, a 
court must decide what substantive law applies to the dispute. Courts do 
this all the time. In this regard, I think that Lynn’s concerns about perni-
cious forum shopping are excessive.58 Lynn also fails to appreciate the 
fact that competition, to the extent that it focuses on and is limited to is-
sues of procedure and efficiency, is actually a good thing. 
E.. Applying the Model—Universalism and the Risks of Excessive Har-
monization 
My concerns with the universalist approach to international insolvency 
also derive from the model discussed above, but they are not as compli-
cated. While I think that Lynn’s concern about the Model Law and Chap-
ter 15 is excessive, because he ignores its limited focus on choice of fo-
rum and procedure, Jay has frequently described modified universalism 
as a stopping point on the way to true universalism, where substantive 
law would be harmonized and true market symmetry attained.59 I do not 
                                                                                                             
 58. Here, however, I differ with the views articulated by Jay in his contribution to this 
symposium, Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Locating the Eye of the Financial Storm, 32 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1019 (2007), and with the approach taken by the UNCITRAL Legisla-
tive Guide on Insolvency with regard to choice of law for bankruptcy cases. Jay argues 
that once a main case has been identified, that choice should carry with it what he calls 
the “big four” choice of law decisions associated with a bankruptcy case—control, prior-
ity, avoidance, and reorganization policy. Recommendation 31 of the UNCITRAL Legis-
lative Guide on Insolvency follows a similar approach. UNCITRAL, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE 
ON INSOLVENCY LAW 69, 73 (2004), available at www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/ 
insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf. For reasons that I will explore in a subsequent Article, I 
believe that this approach places too much power in the hand of the forum court and will 
place undue stress on the nascent cross-border architecture.  
 59. Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 6, at 2283; Jay Lawrence Westbrook, 
Multinational Enterprises in General Default: Chapter 15, the ALI Principles, and the 
EU Insolvency Regulation, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 9 (2002). 
There is no doubt that national insolvency laws differ greatly, especially as to 
priority in distribution, and that these differences will continue to exist for 
some time. Modified universalism responds to this difficulty by proposing a 
pragmatic development of universalism, moving toward the ultimate goal 
within the practical limits established by the markets and by local laws at any 
particular time and place. 
Id. 
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share Jay’s broader aspiration. Like Lynn, Jay tries to analogize in the 
international context from a domestic model, and the analogy does not 
work for him either. When Jay speaks of market symmetry, he envisions 
and aspires to a world that works like one country, indeed, like the 
United States, with a national bankruptcy law that allows an enterprise’s 
failure to be adjudicated by one court under one law.60 Jay wishes for 
something—attainable in the United States because we have a strong 
federal government—that is simply not attainable internationally. No 
such strong central government exists, nor is one likely to exist any time 
in the foreseeable future. 
Seeking the ideal of “one law” is a dangerous aspiration where it can-
not practically be attained. In the international context, uniform laws can 
only be accomplished through harmonization and convergence. Such 
harmonization is only possible where there is consensus around a single 
rule. Such consensus is difficult to obtain, so the scope of harmonization 
will necessarily be narrow. Moreover, some consensus may be mislead-
ing. When one group benefits from harmonization, the consensus may be 
driven by the disenfranchisement of other affected groups (usually be-
cause of collective action problems). Therefore, in my view, the aspira-
tions of international harmonization efforts should be kept minimal, both 
for pragmatic reasons (consensus is difficult to obtain), and for norma-
tive ones (consensus, where it exists, is often driven by a dominant inter-
est group). 
F. Minimal Transparent Harmonization 
Unlike Lynn, I am not compelled by my concerns about jurisdictional 
competition to abandon an aspiration for efficient reorganization of cor-
porate groups coordinated by a court at the entity’s center of main inter-
est. Unlike Jay, I do not seek more than that. My goal is an international 
bankruptcy regime that I call “universal proceduralism.” By choosing a 
forum, one elects a particular bankruptcy procedure, but that procedure 
should be “transparent” with regard to substantive rights across national 
boundaries. Through a regime of harmonized “choice of law,” the effects 
of forum choice on substantive rights can and should be minimized. Like 
Jay, I think Chapter 15 is a welcome first step toward my preferred re-
gime.  
II. UNIVERSAL PROCEDURALISM 
When one defines a system of insolvency laws, one starts with a na-
tion’s rules for creating and enforcing substantive entitlements. In the 
                                                                                                             
 60. Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 6, at 2292. 
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absence of special insolvency rules, parties have a strong incentive to 
grab whatever they can, as quickly as possible, off the carcass of a failing 
business.61 In this guise, insolvency law is indistinguishable from the law 
of contracts and the law of property. Judgments are obtained, judgments 
are enforced. First in time is first in right—end of story. Insolvency law 
morphs into bankruptcy law when one envisions a collective system for 
liquidating claims and distributing the proceeds under court supervi-
sion.62 With this additional layer, one adds rules for determining the pri-
ority of property claims and for prioritizing contractual debt claims. Up 
to this point, the system is largely one of substantive entitlements defined 
by local law. One procedural mechanism is added, a stay of actions that 
preserves the status quo, allows the various claims to be adjudicated, and 
allows the various assets to be distributed in an orderly fashion.63 If an 
entity is being liquidated piecemeal, no particular efficiencies are created 
by global administration. 
The need for market symmetry, for a bankruptcy regime that is coex-
tensive with the reach of the business entity, emerges when reorganiza-
tion merges with governance. At some point in the development of a 
modern bankruptcy system, somebody asks the question, “Wouldn’t we 
be better off continuing to run the business rather than liquidating?” So 
long as an entity is solvent, this governance problem is submerged, be-
cause the firm is governed by its shareholders and managers. Once it 
goes into default, the entity faces a practical and legal governance prob-
lem.64 Creditors, who have no governance rights, do have the power to 
                                                                                                             
 61. See Edward J. Janger, Privacy Property, Information Costs, and the Anticom-
mons, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 899, 925 (2003) (“When a debtor with a viable business becomes 
insolvent, creditors face a coordination problem. Unless they act quickly to grab the as-
sets of the debtor, others may get there first.”). 
 62. See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the 
Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 738, 749–50 (1988) (“Because 
bankruptcy is a collective proceeding, the bankruptcy judge has the power in some cases 
to bind nonconsenting parties. Without such a power, there would be no way to overcome 
the collective action problem that is the justification for bankruptcy in the first in-
stance.”); Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 
96 MICH. L. REV. 47, 50–51 (1997) (noting that the state law collective action problem 
creates a need for bankruptcy law). 
 63. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2006) (automatic stay provision). 
 64. See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., 1991 
WL 277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (stating that “where a corporation is operat-
ing in the vicinity of insolvency,” its officers and directors owe a duty to creditors as well 
as shareholders). New York law takes a similar approach to the management of insolvent 
companies. See New York Credit Men’s Adjustment Bureau v. Weiss, 110 N.E.2d. 397, 
398 (N.Y. 1953) (“If the corporation was insolvent . . . it is clear that defendants, as offi-
cers and directors thereof, were to be considered as though trustees of the property for the 
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pull apart an insolvent business. The creditors are diffuse and face coor-
dination problems. The insight of modern bankruptcy systems is that by 
barring the exit door and giving creditors governance rights, the stake-
holders are more likely to continue the firm in business where it is effi-
cient to do so than they are to force an inefficient liquidation.65 The puz-
zle of transnational bankruptcy law is how to facilitate efficient going 
concern reorganization without encouraging pernicious forum shopping, 
driven by a favorable set of priorities or governance rules. To complicate 
matters further, such a regime should also allow courts to compete over 
procedural efficiencies, and allow legal systems to make substantive 
choices about how to define entitlements within their own jurisdictions. 
This puzzle and the model described above suggest a typology for evalu-
ating laws that are candidates for harmonization: (1) procedures where 
uniformity is not necessary and competition (and innovation) is likely to 
be helpful; (2) procedures where coordination is required in order to ob-
tain the benefits of reorganization; (3) choice of law rules which should 
be harmonized where possible; (4) substantive provisions where conver-
gence is desirable; (5) substantive provisions where local variety is toler-
able or even desirable. Harmonization is desirable in categories 2, 3, and 
4, and undesirable in categories 1 and 5.  
According to Lynn, the Model Law is an attempt to harmonize proce-
dural rules that fall into the first category.66 Lynn’s critique of Delaware 
focuses on the principal reason for pernicious forum shopping—agency 
problems.67 The unsung anti-heroes in his story are what he calls the 
“case placers,” an unholy alliance between incumbent management, law-
yers at a few select New York law firms, and the bankers who finance 
the cases.68 For them, the beauty of Delaware is that the courts have 
                                                                                                             
corporate creditor-beneficiaries.”); see also Cooper v. Parsky, 1997 WL 242534, at *22 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 1997) (“Under New York law, creditors are owed a fiduciary duty by 
officers and directors of a corporation only when the corporation is insolvent.”). 
 65. In the United States, this governance decision is facilitated through a number of 
devices that straddle the line between procedure and substance. While the automatic stay 
can be viewed as procedural, insofar as it seeks to preserve the status quo by stopping 
collection efforts, regulation of governance is substantive. U.S. law places the power of 
governance in the debtor in possession, supervised by committees and the court. See 11 
U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2006).  
 66. LOPUCKI, supra note 25, at 221–26. 
 67. Id. at 255 (“Instead of squeezing failed executives out, the [Delaware] courts al-
lowed more of them to stay and even approved multimillion-dollar bonuses to ‘retain’ 
them.”). 
 68. Id. at 17 (“The lawyers, corporate executives, banks, and investment bankers who 
chose the courts for their cases—the ‘case placers’—had the power to make winners or 
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demonstrated a willingness to allow incumbent management and its 
helpers to maintain control of the case, and hence of the company.69 
Lynn’s concern about the Model Law is that by centralizing the admini-
stration of a case in the court located at the debtor’s COMI,70 the Model 
Law gives jurisdictions something to compete over and the power to de-
liver benefits to the parties who place cases with them.71 
In my view there are four responses to Lynn’s concerns about Chapter 
15. In articulating this response to Lynn with regard to the Model Law, I 
will develop these four responses into the four guiding principles of the 
“universal proceduralist” approach. This approach is generally consistent 
with, though not coextensive with the approach taken in Chapter 15 and 
the Model Law. It seeks to harness jurisdictional competition where it is 
beneficial and render it pointless where it is pernicious. The four princi-
ples are: (1) minimal procedural harmonization; (2) legal transparency 
through choice of law principles; (3) COMI-based venue choice; and (4) 
comity principles including limited articulated bases for non-cooperation. 
I will discuss each of these in order. 
A. Minimal Procedural Harmonization 
The first principle that Universal Proceduralism offers in response to 
LoPucki is minimal procedural harmonization. For Lynn, even the pro-
cedures created by the Model Law, centralizing an international bank-
ruptcy case at the debtors COMI, create too much of an opportunity for 
pernicious competition. Lynn is right that there are risks to procedural 
harmonization, but Lynn focuses on the wrong risks. As I will discuss 
below, the risks of pernicious competition caused by procedural har-
monization are tolerable. The greater risk associated with procedural 
harmonization is that it will preclude competition and innovation that 
might lead to greater efficiency. 
Thus, the first element of “universal proceduralism” is to identify the 
minimum set of procedures that will allow reorganization to happen on 
an entity-wide level without disturbing the relative priority of local enti-
tlements or disturbing local governance rights. This approach is not de-
                                                                                                             
losers of the courts. The case placers wanted more money for themselves and freedom 
from the restrictions of bankruptcy law and procedure.”). 
 69. Id. at 255. 
 70. See Model Law, supra note 12, art. 17(2)(a); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1517(b)(1). 
 71. LOPUCKI, supra note 25, at 216 (“[F]orum-shopping multinationals . . . will 
choose among courts that are plausibly their home country courts. The chosen courts will, 
of course, be competitive ones. Those courts will hold quick hearings, declare themselves 
to be the home country courts, open the proceedings, and declare those proceedings to be 
main.”). 
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signed to stop forum shopping, but to limit its pernicious effects and en-
courage it where beneficial. Parties should shop for “good” judges, and 
favor “well run” courts. They should not shop for biased judges who will 
favor the party making the forum choice, or for biased local law. In this 
regard, it seems to me that the Model Law strikes an appropriate balance. 
It formulates a set of rules that fall within the second category. They fa-
cilitate the administration of a case between and among courts, and little 
else.  
The Model Law’s major provisions can be set forth quite succinctly: 
(1) it provides procedures for a representative of a foreign proceeding to 
obtain recognition and open a case domestically;72 (2) it puts in place an 
automatic stay;73 (3) it describes the relief available to a foreign repre-
sentative in such a way that administering the case will not interfere with 
cases pending in other countries;74 (4) it defines which proceeding is the 
“main” proceeding;75 (5) it creates mechanisms to permit communication 
among courts with cases pending involving the debtor;76 (6) it creates 
principles for coordinating pending proceedings;77 and (7) it creates a 
rule to prevent claimants from double dipping where there are multiple 
cases pending.78 
With these exceptions, the Model law leaves most of a country’s bank-
ruptcy rules untouched. It does not establish priorities. It does not confer 
avoidance powers. It does not establish governance rules, rules for ad-
ministering a case, or rules for confirming a plan of reorganization. All 
of these other crucial aspects of bankruptcy law are left to local law (in-
cluding choice of law). 
B. Harmonized Choice of Law 
The second principle of “universal proceduralism” is harmonization of 
choice of law principles. Lynn’s critique ignores choice of law entirely. 
Lynn assumes that with choice of forum goes choice of law.79 The forum 
jurisdiction, he asserts, will generally apply its own law to the bank-
                                                                                                             
 72. See Model Law, supra note 12, art. 9; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1515. 
 73. See Model Law, supra note 12, art. 20(1); see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 1520–1521. 
 74. See Model Law, supra note 12, art. 19(4); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1519(c). 
 75. See Model Law, supra note 12, art. 2(b); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1502(4). 
 76. See Model Law, supra note 12, art. 25(2); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1525(b). 
 77. See Model Law, supra note 12, art. 29; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1529. 
 78. See Model Law, supra note 12, art. 23; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1530. 
 79. LOPUCKI, supra note 25, at 232 (arguing that if court competition prevails, “mul-
tinational companies [will be] free to chose the courts in which they will reorganize or 
liquidate and the law that will govern the rights of their creditors and other stake-
holders”). 
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ruptcy cases that are filed there.80 This assumption is not logically com-
pelled. Choice of forum and choice of law are two distinct inquiries. 
Courts can and do apply the law of other jurisdictions to disputes that 
come before them.81 They also can, and do, apply the law of other coun-
tries.82  
Indeed, while the Model Law does not attempt to do this, the risk of 
pernicious forum shopping could be considerably reduced through the 
harmonization of choice of law principles. Where choice of law princi-
ples are harmonized, choice of forum does not alter the substantive law 
that applies to a case. This is not a novel approach. Under Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, one public filing will perfect a security in-
terest in all fifty states, because all fifty states have adopted a uniform 
choice of law rule.83 Even without formal harmonization, there exists 
broad commonality about certain choice of law principles. Property 
rights are generally determined by the law of the jurisdiction where the 
property or the debtor is located.84 Contracts are governed by the law of 
the jurisdiction with the most significant interest in the transaction—the 
situs of the contract.85 There are certainly variations in approach for in-
tangible property and for contracts that have no obvious location, but for 
many disputes the answers are predictable. For example, an employment 
contract between an American company and a French employee working 
in France will likely be governed by French labor law. To the extent that 
choice of law principles can be harmonized, choice of forum will dimin-
ish in importance. 
The harder question is how such a multi-law case should be adminis-
tered. U.S. bankruptcy law provides a model, and the Model Law does 
not preclude it. In a case involving a corporate group, multiple cases 
could be administratively consolidated in one court yet decided accord-
ing to the bankruptcy law of multiple jurisdictions. While such a regime 
sounds facially implausible, and working out the details will require 
                                                                                                             
 80. Id. at 231. 
 81. See, e.g., 16 AM. JUR. 2D Conflict of Laws § 5 (1964). 
 82. See id. §§ 9–11. 
 83. See U.C.C. § 9-301 (1998). 
 84. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 223(1) (1971) (“Whether a 
conveyance transfers an interest in land and the nature of the interest transferred are de-
termined by the law that would be applied by the courts of the situs.”). Under Article 9 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, certain property rights are governed by the law of the 
jurisdiction where the debtor is located. See U.C.C. § 9-301 (1998). 
 85. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(1) (1971) (“The rights 
and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are determined by the local 
law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to 
the transaction and the parties . . . .”). 
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more space than is available here, it is still preferable to, or at least no 
more complicated than, the “cooperative territorial” approach advocated 
by LoPucki. Indeed, to a certain extent, this approach has already been 
used in at least one bankruptcy case.86 
An example might help here. If one imagines the case of a debtor with 
three subsidiaries in three different countries, there are three possibilities 
available to the main court for administering the proceeding. Once it has 
opened ancillaries in the countries where assets or subsidiaries are lo-
cated, it could: (1) administer the assets of the subsidiary through the 
ancillary proceedings with the cooperation of those courts in a proceed-
ing not unlike the “cooperative territoriality” described by LoPucki;87 (2) 
it could centrally administer all of the assets, but handle the claims of the 
subsidiary’s creditors under the law of the subsidiary’s jurisdiction, much 
as a court does in the United States when a case is administratively (but 
not substantively) consolidated; or (3) the case might be substantively 
consolidated. Universal proceduralism would follow the second ap-
proach. Universalism would favor the third. 
Universal proceduralist principles can also be applied to the case of a 
single corporate debtor with assets and operations spread across the 
globe. Assets might be centrally administered in the main case, but the 
location of the assets, local law governing those assets, and the law gov-
erning the claimants against those assets might be respected rather than 
collapsed.  
Substantive consolidation is the result that LoPucki assumes will al-
ways occur, because it is easier to administer, and because he assumes 
that the home country court is unconstrained by an appellate court or 
federal law.88 Here he misapprehends the dynamics of the international 
bankruptcy system. The decision to consolidate is not unconstrained. 
Unlike a U.S. case where the orders of one bankruptcy court are self-
executing and enforceable throughout the United States. (but subject to 
appellate review),89 the judge in a main case must still obtain the coop-
eration of foreign courts.  
While the Model Law will make cooperation among courts administra-
tively easier to obtain, cooperation is not a given. Local courts that per-
ceive that their citizens are being harmed may resist cooperation, and 
                                                                                                             
 86. The Collins & Aikman Group case, described by Gabriel Moss in his contribution 
to this symposium, appears to have followed this approach. See Gabriel Moss, Group 
Insolvency – Choice of Forum and Law: The European Experience Under the Influence 
of English Pragmatism, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1005 (2007). 
 87. See LoPucki, Cooperation, supra note 6, at 750. 
 88. LOPUCKI, supra note 25, at 231. 
 89. See 28 U.S.C. 1334(e) (2005). 
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Article 21 of the Model Law, along with section 1522 of Chapter 15, al-
low them to resist actions taken by the court in the main case that violate 
local law. The need for cooperation and the threat of non-cooperation 
place significant constraints on the ability of debtors to use the main case 
to ignore creditor expectations through forum choice. 
C. Constrained Venue Choice 
The third principle of universal proceduralism is constrained venue 
choice. LoPucki heaps particular scorn on the peculiarity in U.S. law that 
combines state of incorporation as a basis for venue and the so-called 
“venue hook.”90 This pair of rules allows all members of a corporate 
group to file wherever an affiliate has a case pending. Thus virtually any 
corporate group can file in Delaware, and reorganize all affiliates in that 
court, regardless of where the business’s operations, assets, and execu-
tives are actually located. LoPucki’s extension of this critique to the 
UNCITRAL Model Law and the E.U. Reg. turns on his view that the 
“center of main interest” approach used in those statutes is the functional 
equivalent of U.S. law and will give forum shopping free reign. 
LoPucki is correct that the COMI standard is a standard rather than a 
rule, but he is wrong to equate it with the U.S. rule (which is clear but 
offers little constraint). While it is true that multiple jurisdictions may lay 
claim to status as the COMI for a multinational enterprise, the standard is 
not completely manipulable. It is unlikely that more than two or three 
jurisdictions will be in a position to claim that they are a debtor’s COMI. 
Management, significant assets, or business operations must be present 
for a jurisdiction to qualify as the COMI.  
Most importantly, however, LoPucki again ignores the necessarily 
multi-jurisdictional nature of the cases governed by the Model Law. Un-
der U.S. law, bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction over property “wher-
ever located and by whomever held”,91 and can gain personal jurisdiction 
through nationwide service of process.92 A bankruptcy court in New 
York can enforce its judgment against assets in Montana without involv-
ing the Montana courts (though it might choose to). While the bank-
                                                                                                             
 90. See LOPUCKI, supra note 25, at 252 (“[N]ew rules should eliminate the venue 
hook—the ability of a parent company to file in the court where the bankruptcy of a sub-
sidiary is pending. Members of a corporate group should be allowed to reorganize to-
gether only at the location of the parent company or the group.”). 
 91. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a); see also H.K. & Shanghai Banking Corp., Ltd. v. Simon (In 
re Simon), 153 F.3d 991, 996 (9th. Cir. 1998) (holding that the jurisdictional reach of 
§541(a) extends outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States), cert. denied, 525 
U.S. 1141 (1999). 
 92. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7004(d).  
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ruptcy estate may have extraterritorial reach, U.S. courts, as a practical 
matter, only have jurisdiction over parties and assets in the United States 
This gives U.S. courts expanded reach with regard to many creditors who 
do business in the United States. However, this power is not global. 
Courts must generally enforce their orders in foreign jurisdictions by 
opening a proceeding in that jurisdiction and seeking to have their orders 
recognized. 
While the Model Law makes recognition of the foreign proceeding 
automatic, and grants a stay of proceedings upon recognition,93 there are 
many situations in which the Model Law permits the local court to de-
termine whether the relief requested should be granted.94 Even where the 
Model Law does not permit it, such discretion exists as a practical mat-
ter. The proceeding contemplated by the Model Law is not self execut-
ing. The court handling the main proceeding must still obtain the coop-
eration of the foreign court.95 While the Model Law instructs a court in a 
non-main proceeding to defer to the main proceeding,96 there is no logi-
cal reason why the main/non-main characterization of a case cannot and 
therefore will not be contested, where an implausible choice has been 
made. While the debtor may have a number of plausible choices as to 
which jurisdiction is main and which is non-main, concern about defend-
ing that choice will limit the debtor’s discretion and the forum court’s 
power. 
D. Comity 
While principles of comity and the instruction to cooperate contained 
in the Model Law encourage courts to defer to each other, comity is a 
double-edged sword. Comity principles also allow a court to conclude 
that an act of a foreign court is not entitled to respect or cooperation. 
Even where such behavior is discouraged by statute, foreign courts have 
the power to say “no.” Whenever deciding whether it is the main pro-
ceeding, a court must consider whether it is the right court to administer 
the debtor’s case. Whenever seeking cooperation, courts must be careful 
to articulate the reasons why their orders are entitled to respect. 
1. The Limits of Cooperation 
Courts faced with these decisions are always cognizant of the risk of a 
“war of courts.” They ignore this concern at their peril. One excellent 
                                                                                                             
 93. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
 94. See Model Law, supra note 12, art. 19; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1521. 
 95. See Model Law, supra note 12, art. 10; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1519. 
 96. See Model Law, supra note 12, art. 28; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1529. 
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example arises out of the Yukos bankruptcy.97 There a Russian oil com-
pany with virtually all of its assets and operations in Russia created a 
subsidiary in Texas for the sole purpose of opening a case there. The 
Texas bankruptcy court opened the case, and the debtor immediately 
sought to enjoin the sale by Yukos of all of its assets in Russia.98 Though 
the forum shop was blatant, the U.S. court issued the injunction any-
way.99 The U.S. court ignored the fact that, to enforce its order, it would 
have to obtain the cooperation of the Russian courts.100 The sale in Rus-
sia went ahead as planned.101 The only effect of the Texas court’s order 
was that certain bidders, who had assets in the United States, did not bid 
in Russia because they did not wish to disregard the U.S. order (likely 
reducing the price obtained at auction).102 
Even in a regime such as that envisioned by the Model Law, comity 
remains important as a structural principle. The possibility of a war of 
courts continues to limit the power of the main proceeding. Cooperation 
must be earned. In the “universal” world that Jay envisions, the goal will 
be a one-court proceeding with automatic recognition and virtually man-
                                                                                                             
 97. In re Yukos Oil Co., 320 B.R. 130 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2004) (order granting initial 
injunction against auction ), and dismissed, two months later, 321 B.R. 396 (Bankr. S.D. 
Tex. 2005) (dismissing Yukos Oil’s Chapter 11 petition for “cause” under 11 U.S.C. 
§1112(b) on the basis that Yukos’ ability to successfully effectuate its reorganization plan 
was severely hindered by the Russian government’s apparent unwillingness to cooperate 
with Yukos, and moreover, Yukos’ motives in filing were questionable in light of Yukos’ 
transfer of funds to a U.S. bank account less than one week prior to filing its bankruptcy 
petition).  
 98. Id. at 132. 
 99. Id. The court perfunctorily concluded “that Debtor maintains significant assets in 
the Southern District of Texas, and that Debtor has standing to be a debtor under Chapter 
11 of the Bankruptcy Code.” Id.; see also Gregory L. White, Russel Gold & Thaddeus 
Herrick, Yukos Seeks Refuge in a U.S. Court, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2004, at A3.  
  100.  See Gregory L. White & Guy Chazan, Mystery Russian Company Wins Bid on 
Yukos Unit—Offer of $9.37 Billion Seals Fate of Beleaguered Firm, But Many Questions 
Linger, WALL. ST. J., Dec. 20, 2004, at A1. 
  101.  See Erin E. Arvedlund & Simon Romero, Kremlin Reasserts Hold on Russia’s 
Oil & Gas, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2004, at A1.  
 102. Id.; see also Guy Chazan, Intrigue Deepens Over Yokus Buyer—Gazprom Sells 
Unit Snared In U.S. Court, While Bidder is Tied to Siberia’s Surgut, Wall St. J., Dec. 22, 
2004, at A2. More recently, the Russian debtor sought recognition in an ancillary case 
under Chapter 15. See Chapter 15 Petition for Recognition of Foreign Proceeding filed by 
Yukos Oil Co. (In re: Petition of Eduard K. Rebgun, as Receiver of Yukos Oil Co.), No. 
06-B-10775 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2006), available at http://www.chapter15.com/ 
bin/chapter15_view_company?cid=1145244846. Under the current regime, and under the 
Model Law regime, courts will still have the resources to fight back. 
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datory cooperation.103 In the world that I envision, cooperation will be a 
strong presumption, but can be withheld. As such, it is necessary to seek 
to articulate the principles that might disentitle an order of a main pro-
ceeding to cooperation. 
2. Comity Principles that Permit Non-cooperation 
If the goal of an international insolvency law that facilitates efficient 
cross-border reorganizations is to be realized, the circumstances under 
which a court should decline to cooperate with a foreign main proceed-
ing must necessarily be limited and carefully defined. There are three 
appropriate bases under which a court might decline to cooperate with a 
main proceeding without compromising the goal of efficient case ad-
ministration: agency, illegality, and violation of creditors’ expectations. 
These principles fit comfortably within general principles of comity, but 
they are worth articulating and defining with some particularity in the 
bankruptcy context. 
a. Agency 
Agency problems create a very limited basis for objecting when a court 
concludes that the main proceeding is administering the estate in a way 
that advantages one stakeholder class but harms the estate as a whole. It 
is important to recognize that this principle does not turn on the distribu-
tional scheme of the particular country, but on whether assets are being 
wasted for the benefit of a particular stakeholder. Needless to say, prin-
ciples of deference should apply, and it is not sufficient that one court 
concludes that the other court is not maximizing value. Rather the con-
clusion must be that the other court is destroying value at the behest of, 
and for the benefit, of one class of stakeholders. 
b. Illegality 
A second limited basis for non-cooperation arises when a court can be 
shown not to be following the choice of law or substantive law principles 
that its own choice of law or substantive law principles would require. In 
other words, the court declining to cooperate would have to show that the 
court with which it was declining to cooperate was acting illegally. 
                                                                                                             
 103. See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 6, at 2299 (“[T]he proper long-term, 
theoretical solution to the problem of multinational insolvency is universalism, whether 
or not such a solution is achievable in the foreseeable future.”). 
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c. Creditor Expectations 
Finally, protection of creditor expectations provides a limited basis for 
non-cooperation if the act of the main proceeding would defeat the le-
gitimate expectations of domestic creditors. This is not unlike the stan-
dard in former section 304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.104 These legiti-
mate expectations should be judged against the background of the fact 
that creditors knew they were doing business with a foreign entity. In 
most instances, choice of law principles applied in the main proceeding 
should provide sufficient protection to the legitimate expectations of 
these creditors. Defeated creditor expectations, therefore, should only 
rarely provide a basis for non-cooperation. 
None of these bases for non-cooperation are anything new. Most of 
them would have operated as bases for non-cooperation under former 
sections 304 and 305 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. The key point here is 
that these limited bases for non-cooperation should be sufficient to limit 
the extent of pernicious forum shopping under the COMI standard of the 
Model Law without foreclosing the legitimate reasons for choosing one 
court over another, and without stifling the development of local law. 
E. Conclusion 
In practice, there may be relatively little difference between what I de-
scribe as universal proceduralism and what Jay describes as modified 
universalism. The difference lies in aspiration, rather than practical ad-
ministration. Modified universalism starts small, but retains larger aspira-
tions. It is these larger aspirations that worry me, and they worry me for 
some of the same reasons that they worry Lynn. There are benefits to 
harmonization, but it has a dark side too. It can facilitate pernicious ju-
risdictional competition. It can stifle beneficial jurisdictional competition 
as well, and because it is limited to areas where there is consensus, it 
may be substantively watered down. On balance I think the benefit of 
harmonizing key aspects of bankruptcy procedure outweighs the costs, 
but I would keep the scope narrow in order to leave room for local legis-
lation. 
III. UNIVERSAL PROCEDURALISM BUT DOMESTIC TRADITIONALISM 
While I have spent most of my effort in this Article arguing against the 
limited aspirations of LoPucki’s cooperative territoriality, I think that his 
work demonstrates important limits on the universalist vision of one case 
                                                                                                             
 104. See 11 U.S.C. § 304, repealed by Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005, 119 Stat. 146.  
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and one law. Lynn’s view is that neither one case nor one law are 
achievable goals without giving rise to the unacceptable cost of facilitat-
ing a race to the bottom, and perhaps eliminating beneficial legal diver-
sity.105 In my view, the goal of one case is achievable, but the goal of one 
law is neither achievable nor desirable. 
Under any scenario that I can envision, applying “one law” to a trans-
national case will either create excessive incentives for forum shopping, 
or require excessive levels of harmonization. My concern lies in the lim-
its of harmonization. To the extent that harmonization is sought on dis-
tributive questions, the likely motivation for the harmonization effort will 
be to benefit a concentrated interest group at the expense of the public at 
large. To the extent that harmonization is not achieved, then these same 
distributive questions will create tremendous pressures on participants in 
the bankruptcy system to engage in forum shopping. In my view, the best 
we can hope for is a bankruptcy regime which administers a case in a 
common coordinated proceeding, but which is transparent as to the major 
distributive questions regarding property distribution and governance. 
This may require one court to apply many different laws to different 
pieces of property and to the different legal entities involved in the case. 
The question that Jay might raise is whether such an arrangement is 
workable enough to allow reorganizations to occur. I believe it will still 
be a significant improvement over current law. Bankruptcy courts are 
familiar with cases that are administratively but not substantively con-
solidated. As such, they are familiar with the need to administer a num-
ber of entities in one case, sometimes with multiple plans. Universal pro-
ceduralism means that in some of these cases, the court may have to ac-
tually administer some of the cases under different bankruptcy laws. In 
doing so, they may need to seek the assistance of the ancillary courts in 
other jurisdictions, but the goal should be to gain the collective benefits 
of coordination without disturbing the expectations of national creditors. 
The principles I have articulated here are quite similar to those articu-
lated by Baird and Jackson in their work on the so-called “creditors’ bar-
gain” heuristic.106 In their view, the goal of bankruptcy law should be 
limited to the steps necessary to correct the collective action problem 
                                                                                                             
 105. Lynn M. LoPucki, Global and Out of Control?, 79 AM. BANKR L.J. 79, 102 
(2005) (“Harmonization is a euphemism for forcing commercially less important coun-
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 106. See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the 
Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Se-
cured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97 (1984). 
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created by the race of diligence.107 Non-bankruptcy entitlements should 
not be disturbed beyond the minimum necessary to capture the so-called 
reorganization dividend or going concern value.108 In other scholarship, I 
have argued that this approach understates the aspirations of domestic 
bankruptcy law.109 Baird and Jackson’s argument turns on a combination 
of contractarian theory, concerns about judicial competence, and con-
cerns about forum shopping. Ronald Mann has pointed out that the “con-
tractarian” argument does not work to the extent that it applies to argu-
ments about how to divide up reorganization surplus.110 I have argued 
that judicial competence does not generate an argument for procedural-
ism either.111 Finally, the only argument that remains is Baird and Jack-
son’s concern about forum shopping into bankruptcy. That argument too 
disappears domestically when one realizes that bankruptcy specific pri-
orities condition the negotiations that occur in the shadow of bankruptcy. 
For these reasons, I am not convinced by the “proceduralist” argument in 
connection with domestic bankruptcy. 
In international bankruptcy, however, the proceduralist’s forum shop-
ping argument has bite. To the extent that individual countries make 
bankruptcy specific choices about legal entitlements, they raise the stakes 
of true jurisdictional forum shopping and increase the likelihood of a 
race to the bottom. Thus, to the extent that countries need to be free to 
experiment with their local bankruptcy policies and to regulate the be-
havior of local entities inside or outside of bankruptcy, the law of trans-
national insolvencies should not seek to influence or limit those options. 
                                                                                                             
 107. Id. at 100 (“[B]ankruptcy law at its core should be designed to keep individual 
actions against assets, taken to preserve the position of one investor or another, from 
interfering with the use of those assets favored by the investors as a group.”). 
 108. Baird and Jackson argue as follows: 
The relevant bankruptcy goal . . . is not that a firm stay in business, but rather 
that its assets are deployed in a way that, consistent with applicable nonbank-
ruptcy restrictions, advances the interests of those who have rights in them. 
When there is no going-concern surplus, a reorganization would seem inappro-
priate because the firm’s assets are worth more (and hence the owners recover 
more of what they advanced the debtor) if the assets are sold and used by third-
party purchasers than they are if kept together. Conversely, when a firm’s as-
sets are worth more as a going concern, the owners, as a group, are probably 
better off if the assets are kept together, even though the firm may have de-
faulted on some of its obligations or may be insolvent. 
Id. at 118–19. 
 109. See Janger, supra note 18, at 566–83. 
 110. See Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy and the Entitlements of the Government: Whose 
Money is it Anyway?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 993 (1995). 
 111. See Janger, supra note 18, at 593–98. 
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IV. UNIVERSAL PROCEDURALISM IN PRACTICE—SOME CONCLUDING 
THOUGHTS ON CHAPTER 15 
The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency is now the 
law in the United States and nine other countries, including the United 
Kingdom, Japan, and Mexico.112 In my view, it provides a legal frame-
work that can foster a universal proceduralist regime. Indeed, the prag-
matic genius of the Model Law is that it provides a framework for coop-
eration that can accommodate case structures of almost any type. It 
clearly favors, however, a regime where cases are opened in the various 
jurisdictions where an entity has assets, executive offices, operations, or 
subsidiaries, and that those cases will “defer” to the main proceeding 
opened in the entity’s COMI. 
As implemented in the United States, Chapter 15 gives a foreign repre-
sentative access to U.S. courts to open either an ancillary case or a full 
blown case under another chapter of Title 11. Recognition of the pro-
ceeding is automatic,113 and a stay goes into effect with regards to the 
debtors assets in the United States.114 Other relief is available under U.S. 
law to the extent the foreign representative requests it, including the 
power to operate the business. It creates mechanisms that allow courts to 
communicate and coordinate the proceedings pending in various courts. 
To the extent that it addresses the concerns I have raised above, the 
Model Law satisfies the requirements of universal proceduralism. It har-
monizes only the minimal procedures necessary to administer a cross 
border case. It defines the “main case” as the case opened in the jurisdic-
tion that is the debtor’s center of main interest. As I have discussed 
above, this is a term that is open to significant interpretation, as the re-
cent Eurofoods decision115 under the E.U. Reg. demonstrates, but it pro-
vides sufficient constraint on forum shopping to be preferable to the ad 
hoc mechanisms available under current law. It also contains limits on 
comity that should prevent a main proceeding from competing in ways 
that violate the principles of agency, legality, or creditor expectations 
described above. In particular sections 1507 and 1522 allow the court to 
deny relief requested by the foreign representative if it is not in the inter-
                                                                                                             
 112. Bob Wessels, Will UNCITRAL Bring Changes to Insolvency Proceedings Outside 
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(“Several countries have indeed enacted legislation that—to a varying extent—
incorporates the Model Law into domestic law, these countries are Eritrea, Japan, Poland, 
South Africa, Spain, Mexico and within Yugoslavia, Montenegro, USA and (as of 4 April 
2006) Great Britain.”). 
 113. See Model Law, supra note 12, art. 9; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1515. 
 114. See Model Law, supra note 12, art. 20; see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 1520–1521. 
 115. Case C-341/04, Eurofood IFSC Ltd., 2006 E.C.R. I-3813. 
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est of creditors or affected parties.116 These provisions are broad enough 
to allow the court to consider the principles articulated above.  
The element missing from the Model Law, and which remains to be 
accomplished if a system of universal proceduralism is to be realized, is 
a harmonized set of choice of law principles. This, it seems to me, is the 
next and most important step in realizing a regime of universal proce-
duralism. 
 
                                                                                                             
 116. See Model Law, supra note 12, arts. 7, 22; see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 1507, 1522. 
